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1. SUMMARY: The Solicitor General seeks review of a decision of 
Court of Customs and Patent Appeals. The CCPA held that the Patent anc 
1/ 
The 








Trademark Office Board of Appeals had erroneous ly c oncluded that resp ' s 
"machine system" or apparatus claims with respect to an automatic financial 
record-keeping system which employs a digital computer related to non-
statutory subject matter under 35 U.S. C. § 101 and w ere obvious variations 
of prior art under § 103. The SG contends that the deci s ion is inconsistent 
with Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, and he see k s a holding by this Cour1 
- --- --... 
that programs for existing general purpose digital com puters, howe v er 
claimed, are not patentable under present law. -
2. FACTS AND DECISION BELOW: Resp applied for a patent on a - -
"m~ hi~ s x,p te1;1 !.'.:!.r automatic record-kee_J> ing of banl_;,_ check_:,_ and de~ i:s . ,. 
:w,.a ~
The purpose of the system is to allow banks to offer small-volume de ma.'ici 
deposit (checking) account customers an individual bookkeeping serv ice tr.a t 
includes a categorization of each credit or debit transaction by each custom ei 
In essence, the systems carries out the individual custo m er's as well a s the 
bank's bookkeeping. The means used are a general purpose digital c01nputer -
and a control system. The control system comprehends a general control 
which is applicable to the processing operations that are common to most 
customers and a master control for the operations that vary on an 
individual basis with each customer .' 
1 ,, ' 
he general control, as reduced to ____________,,_ 
("'L,_/ I\ 
practice, is ~ orm of a software program, anct1he 'master control is a 
series of sub-files, one for each customer, which are in the form of a 
--------------- ------------
sequence of records containing suitable control mechanisms and the 
.--.-----------






Resp' s patent appJ ication described the necessary steps in the 
operation, contained flo w diagrams of the entire apparatus, and disclosed a 
print-out of a complete program and a detailed flow chart thereof for use wit l 
a known commercial general-purpose computer, the IBM 1400 series, to pro 
vide the special-purpose computer which formed the apparatus of resp ' s 
\ 
invention. Resp sought to patent the system both as a "process " and as a 
"machine system" or apparatus. The patent ~mi~er rejected all the claimi 
On appeal, the Board of Appeals also rejected resp's claims (in a decision 
rendered prior to Benson). Rejecting the examiner's reliance on the prem isE 
that an unprogrammed, or a differently programmed general-purpose 
computer is the same machine as the one that would result from resp' s 
programming of the same or of a similar computer, the Board entered new 
rejections as authorized by Rule 196(b), Rules of Practice in Patent Ca s es. 
It rejected the claims under 35 U.S. C. § 112 for indefiniteness in failin g to 
distinctly point out the invention, under § 101 for subject matter outside the 
patent statutes, and under § 103 for obviousness. 
On appeal of the rejection of resp' s apparatus claims, the Court of 
Customs and Patent Appeals reversed. Noting that the Board ' s rejection 
under § 112 was based on its conclusion that resp was claiming the " relation-
ship of a bank and its customers, not any particular configuration of 
business machinery," the majority stated that no such claim could be inf erre, 
from resp' s apparatus claims, which, in "typical means -plus -function 
language" were clearly drawn to a "record-keeping n1achine system for 








claims were indefinite ins afar as they purportedly enco1npas sed a human 
being as part of the claimed apparatus, concluding that resp' s specification 
made it quite clear 11 that the claimed apparatus automatically performs the 
identifying operations II and that 11 those operations are [not l performed by a 
human being. 11 Turning to the Board's holding that resp' s system was not in 
the 11technological arts II and thus that the claims were for non- statutory 
subject matter under § 101, the majority reasoned that record- k eeping 
machine systems clearly are within the 11 technological arts 11 and that the 
Board's reluctance to 111 grant a monopoly to [resp l on a method of conducting 
the banking business 111 was misplaced. The majority stated: 11 The appealed 
apparatus claims are not drawn to cover either a method of doing business or 
even a method of bookkeeping. Nor would banks 'be restricted to the use of 
their data processing equipment only for their own bookkeeping and not . 
[be l allowed to freely expand into the business of keeping books for their 
customers. 1 Obviously, banks would be free to so expand their services and 
use any apparatus they may desire except the apparatus set forth in [resp' s l 
claims. 11 The majority rejected the applicability of Benson, noting that 
resp's claims were in apparatus rather than process form and did not claim 
~
or encompass a law of nature, a mathematical formula, or an algorithm. 
Finally, the majority rejected the Board's § 103 obviousness determinations, 
concluding that although it might have been obvious to modify known record-
keeping apparatus to achieve a summary sheet of a plurality of separate 
accounts, resp' s claimed invention, producing a breakdown of a customer's 






obvious, and that a previously issued patent similarly did not render t he 
subject matter of the appealed claims obvious. 
Chief Judge Markey dissented from the majority's obviousness holdin 
--------
Judge Rich, although expressing his disagreement with Benson (he wrote the 
CCPA decision), noted that resp' s machine or apparatus and process claims 
were really directed to the same invention, and that resp had stated that "thi 
invention is being sold as a computer program." Thus deeming "the reality 
that the invention is a program," Judge Rich concluded that there was no 
realistic distinction between the invention involved in Benson and the in,·entic 
involved here. For "[e lvery competent patent draftsman knows how to " 
redraft process claims "in machine system form. " 
3. CONTENTIONS: The SG argues: (1) (a) The inventiveness -- the 
novel discovery - - claimed by resp does not lie in the preparation of a 
computer program, although resp concedes that that is the commercially-
exploitable fruit of the claimed invention. Rather, it resides in the general 
idea or purpose which the computer would be programmed to implement. 
(b) Ideas, however unobvious they may be, have always constituted "non-- - -
statutory" and thus unpatentable subject matter. See Bens on, 409 U.S. at 6 7 
~
This principle has been applied to business ideas. See Seagram & Sons, Inc. 
v. Marzall, 180 F. 2d 26 (CA DC). Resp' s claimed invention is not like any 
piece of tangible machinery. The "means" disclosed by resp are those of an 
ordinary general-purpose digital computer, with a program directing the 
co1nponents of the computer to sort, check and deposit data into different 





- -- 6 -
conventiona lly to print out the r esults of the sorting op e ration. Becaus e res 
idea, like Benson's, "has no substantial practical application except in 
connection with a digital computer," a patent on resp' s "machine system" 
would "wholly preempt" use of that idea and in "practical effect be a patent o 
the idea." Benson, 409 U.S. at 71- 72. The only actual machine inv oked is 
the familiar general-purpose digital computer. The court below elevat ed 
form o ver substance, providing a simple means for circumventing the 
important principle applied in Benson. (c) Even w here an idea is not obv ious 
its implementation must be unobvious as well. Benson, supra, at 6 7- 68 ; 
Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo, 333 U.S. 127, 130. The program imple m enti 
resp's idea co-acts with an ordinary computer in an ordinary way; there is 
neither "synergism" between the program and the com puter, see Ander s on's 
Black Rock, Inc. v. Pavement Salv a ge Co., 396 U.S. 5 7, 61, nor a newly-
invented apparatus that helps carry out the prog.ram and with which the 
claimed monopoly is tied. Accordingly, no inv ention has been added to or 
combined with resp's business idea to transmute it into a patentable process 
product. (2) If the decision below is not viewed as granting a patent or a mer 
business idea, then it must be regarded as granting a patent covering the 
computer program required to implement resp' s idea. The grant of a patent 
on resp' s program, however, would, like the rejected claim in Bens on, mear 
patenting a program for conventional use in a digital computer inv olving no 
use of new technology. See 409 U.S. at 7 I. (3) Even if it is assumed that 
resp' s idea for a new use of a bank's general purpose digital computer 







the art and therefore unpatentable under § 103. (The SG raises this issue on 
"to place the case before this Court in the full context of the somewhat 
interrelated issues decided by the court below.") 
Resp argues that the Court lacks jurisdiction to review the " new use < 
an old machine" rejection of resp' s invention originally made by the Examine 
and reversed by the Board, since review would involve an appeal by petr f r01 
his own Board's decision in violation of the Patent Code. See Brenner v. 
Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 523 n . 6. Resp also contends that the questions 
presented by the SG depend on is sues of technological facts of computers and 
computer programs as to which there is no evidence in the record. "The 
review here requested not only of the claimed machine but of all machines 
produced with computer programs, would not be appropriate, for this Court 
would not have the basis for reaching the conclusion that all computer 
programs are unpatentable. 11 In that regard, resp notes that the Court 
refused to make a broad holding with respect to the unpatentability of compute 
programs in Benson, 409 U.S. at 71, and it argues that there is no other 
reason to grant the petition. Resp' s combination of control mechanisms is 
unobvious, because it is "synergistic," that is, of an "effect greater than the 
sum of the several effects taken separately. 11 See Anderson's Black Roc k, 
Inc . , 396 U . S. at 61. The claims herein, unlike those in Benson, are not 
directed to mathematics, nor to a process, mathematical or otherwise, but 
are limited to apparatus and to presently existing machinery. With respect t c 
the SG's "new use of an old machine" argument, resp renews its obj e ct ions 







require the decision of issues of technological fact as to which there is no 
evidence in the record. In addition, resp contends that CCPA decisions and 
the literature support the proposition that 11the addition of a software prograr 
to control a general-purpose computer ... is just as much a machine 
addition to the general-purpose computer as is the additional hardware 
programming that may be used to enlarge or enhance the character of an 
existing hardware computer. 11 
The Computer & Business Equipment Manufacturers Association has -
filed a motion and brief amicus curiae urging that the petition be granted --
because the decision below ii.as created uncertainty as to the meaning of the 
Court's decision in Benson, raising the possibility that the holding in that ca~ 
can be obviated by routine claim drafting. That confusion, CBEMA maintain : 
will have economic impact of major proportions on inventors, practice befor, 
the Patent Office, patent litigation, government contracting, aid the public 
generally. To defer decision until patent infringement litigation eventuates 
and a conflict develops will simply multiply the opportunities for endless 
litigation. 
4. DISCUSSION: I am puzzled by resp' s argument that the SG is 
foreclosed from a "new use of an old machine" argument. For, whether or 
not the Commissioner is bound by Board determinations, the argument is 
simply part and parcel of the SG' s position that resp' s claims are bad under 
§ l O 1, which is s.ue is properly before the Court. Similarly, although 
asserting on the one hand that the record is barren of evidence necessary to 







claimed, are patentable, resp maintains on the oth e r hand that the Court 
rejected the broad argument against patentability in Bens on "after an 
exhaustive presentation of the technological is sues. 11 I share Judge Rich ' s 
confusion as to the meaning of Benson. At one point the Court stresses the 
"abstract and sweeping" nature of the process claim , while at another it 
attaches significance to the fact that the formula " has no substantial p r a ctica 
application except in connection with a digital computer. 11 409 U.S., a t 68, 
Moreover, I agree with the Judge that the Court's statement of " [w ]ha t \'1: e 
come down to in a nutshell," 409 U.S., at 71, see id., at 71-72, appears to 
give the lie to the immediately preceding disclaimers. Perhaps even :,1.o r e 
revealing is the quotation from the 1966 Report of the President's Com:-:,is sic 
on the Patent System and the call for legislation. 409 U.S., at 72- 73. 
In Appendix D to his petition, the SG demonstrates how claim 8 in 
Benson can be revised to read as a machine system claim . Whether t h e fact 
that resp' s claims relate to a subsidiary or additional art, while the claim s i 
Benson involved only data processing itself, is a relevant distinction re m ains 
unclear. It is a distinction which marked CCPA decisions prior to _!?en s on, 
which was mentioned in the CCPA decision in Benson, 441 F. 2d 682, 686 , bu1 
which did not affect that decision. Of course, this Court did not discuss any 
of those pre-Benson CCPA cases. 
It is clear that the confusion as to the meaning of Benson is not 
confined to Judge Rich a nd the writer. Moreover, it would seem that rev iew 
at this time is warrante d to forestall the further confusion, ex pense and 







that decision, narrowly interpreting Benson, CCPA did precisely what some 
commentators, despairing of congressional action, have advocated. See, 
~• Note !Protection of Computer Programs: Resurrection of the Standard 
50 Notre Dame L. 333, 344-345 (1974). 
t 
The question of obviousness is not, as the SG concedes, independentl'. 
e~wor,.:hy, but his reasoning for including it as a question presented also 
rgues for its inclusion in a grant if such there is to be. 
There are a response and a motion and brief amicus curiae. 
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FROM: Chris Whitman ~ DATE: December 8, 1975 
~/4-~ ~<'I-~. . . 
~ -?~ L~~~ ~~~~ 3/ , .._ \A _ / ,, 11 
No. 74-1033 DANN v. JOHNSTON ~~vL-
u ~_,µJ ~.. I.::, ~ ~ 
I would reverse, principally because I think ~ ~ 
Gottschalk v . Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972), points in tha~ 
direction and because I think this troublesome area is b~~ 
4--~ 
left to Congressional resolution. A big caveat is that I am~. 
confused by both Benson and the briefs. Argument may shed 
light that will change my mind. 
Frankly, Benson is such a poorly drafted opinion 
that it is almost impossible to say whether it conclusively 
disposes of the situation before us. On the one hand, it 
stresses that the patent sought in that case would cover "a 
generalized formulation for programs to solve mathematical 
problems" unrelated "to any particular end use." It compares 
the claim to that rejected in Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Co., 
333 U.S. 127 (1948), which held that natural phenomena are not 
patentable. The same principle, the Court said, applies to 
mental processes and abstract intellectual concepts. The 
practical effect of permitting the claimed patent would be to 





itself." Relying on this language, the Court could limit 
Benson to programs involving basic· mathematical processes. 
2. 
But this limitation seems artificial. The patent sought here, 
like the claim in Benson, is essentially an idea implemented 
in a program. And, as in Benson, the idea itself, isolated ~ 
from the computer, is rather routine - here, a method of ~ ~ ~-- ~w~ 
keeping accounts. ~~ 
In addition to the language discussed above, Benson 
also stressed, "The . procedures can be carried out in 
existing computers long in use, no new machine being necessary. 
And, as noted, they can also be performed without a computer." 
A "process" claim of this sort, the Court went on to say, was 
much too sweeping to be patentable. This side of Benson may 
foreclose our case, for it is equally applicable to the accounting 
method at issue here. Furthermore, this language seems to bar 
all programs (or at least those that do not concern an innovative 
way of progrannning). 
The Court expressly discla imed making a decision that 
"precludes a patent for any program servicing a computer." But 
the following three paragraphs (the final paragraphs of the 
opinion) indicate that the Court intended, as a minimum, to 
~ ~ 
foreclose patents for a wide range of computer programs. The 
Court quoted at length from the Report of the President's 
Connnission on the Patent System (1966). That report, the 





[the referent is unclear] be patentable. The Report cited 
the Patent Office's "lack of a classification technique 
and the requisite search files" as well as "the tremendous 
volume of prior art being generated." The Commission also 
noted that the development of programs had "undergone 
substantial and satisfactory growth in the absence of patent 
protection and [that ] copyright protection . is presently 
3. 
available." After the extended quotation the Court concluded 
that, "[i]f programs are to be patentable, considerable 
problems are raised which only committees of Congress can manage ... 
Having struggled with this case, I am inclined to agree. 
Respondent (the patent claimant) apparently thought 
that Benson was dispositive of any "process" claim that he could 
make. He had submitted a "process" claim at the request of 
the examiner, who thought it appropriate since the invention 
submitted could be preformed on any general- purpose digital "9~ 
computer. Th_e process claim was dropped~ after the decision I~ 
in Benson. The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals' decision Af1 
also stressed that the instant claims are "in apparatus form" ~ 
and thus are not foreclosed by Benson, which concerned the 
question of whether the formula was "a patentable process." 
The distinction is merely formal, as the portion of the Commission 
~
Report quoted in Benson specifically pointed out: 
Direct attempts to patent programs have been 
rejected on the ground of nonstatutory subject 
matter. Indirect attempts to obtain patents 





a process, or a machine or components 
thereof programmed in a given manner, 
rather than as a program itself, have 
confused the issue further and should not 
be permitted. 
4. 
The dropping of the "process" claims puts this case in an odd 
position f-0r the overruling or limiting of Benson, because we 
have only the "apparatus11 or "machine" claims left to work with. 
If this invention is patentable, it seems to me that it should 
be patentable as a "process." 
i', .,,, ,·~ 
If I were approaching this issue as a legislator 
(or even, perhaps, if it were a case of first impression), my 
inclination would be to adopt the position expressed in the 
excellent amicus brief of the American Patent Law Association. 
That brief urges that the patentability of programs turn solely ,. ___... 
on the question of obviousness (§ 103) and that applications for 
program patents not be automatically dismissed as involving 
subject matter unpatentable under§ 101. My understanding is I 
that programs can be innovative, perhaps in the circuitry or 
in the language devised. The policy of encouraging the 
development of new techniques and the spread of these techniques 
free from the fear of pirating is as great where programs are 
concerned as in any other area of technology. Moreover, if I 






to perform in a given way would be patentable, while a 
program that could be added to turn a general-purpose computer 
temporarily into a machine that performed exactly the same 
function in exactly the same way would not. 
The SG purports to leave room for the patenting of 
true innovations in computer programming, but I am not at 
all clear how he would draw the line. On page 29 of his brief, 
he leaves open "the possible patentability of other types 
of computer programs" (emphasis added). The only clue that 
we have a s to what "other types" he means is his mention in the 
same paragraph that respondent ' s claim contemplates "programming, 
in the ordinary way, a conventional, general purpose digital 
computer." Perhaps, the SG has no objections to the 
patentability of "nonordinary" programs. If so, is this anything 
Other than an "obviousness" test? As the APLA amicus brief 
points out, the SG, in his reply brief to the response to his 
petition for certiorari, claimed to recognize "the possibility 
of patentability if a program co-acts with an ordinary computer 
in a 'synergistic' way, if the program is carried out with 
newly-invented apparatus, or if a program produces a new use 
for an old machine sufficiently inventive to be patentable as 
a process". (R. Br. at 2) This qualification is not restated 
in the SG's briefs on the merits, so it is not clear how it 





there is some sort of coherent way of leaving the options 
suggested by the SG open, I would do so. 
Incidentally, the Commission report says that 
' 
6. 
programs can be copyrighted. If so, is there an additional 
need for patent coverage? 
The patenting of programs presents hard questions 
that call for more technical expertise and understanding of 
the computer field that this Court (or at least this clerk) 
poss esses. Congress is much better equipped to handle them 
if it will. My only concern with leaving the decisions and 
the line-drawing to that body is my understanding that it is 
reluctant to expand the patent laws generally. If that is 
the case, this difficult area may be left in limbo by default. . .. ~ 
This case demonstrates why fairly specific guide-
lines regarding "obviousness" are necessary to guide the 
Court of Customs and Patent Appeals if computer programs are to 
be patentable. I find it very difficult to see why the 
invention claimed here is not obvious. With the respondent's 
fine language sheared off, he is merely adding another type 
of information data to that already fed to the computer and 
deriving another set of totals. If that is the case, respondent 
has done nothing more than use ordinary methods of programing 






to a type of use within the original contemplation of the 
basic machine. If this kind of program is patentable, what 
is the limit? Every time a different type of data is to 
be processed by a computer, the circuitry must be modified 
to some extent. Is every one of these modifications 
patentable? 
Respondent argues that he has gone beyond the 
ordinary type of progranuning by devising a system with two 
controls. I do not have the background to evaluate whether 
this really is an innovation or wherher respondent is just 
playin g word games. The SG does not address the matter 
directly . 
Chris 
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- Deanber 11, 1975 To: Mr. Justice Powell 
Froms Kent Bloom, Assistant Clerk (Computer specialist) 
Subjects Patentability of computer programs 
Our conversation this morning while riding to work started me 
thinking again about the patentability of computer programs, and 
I was struck with the idea that I have been approaching this problem 
from the wrong direction. 
As a computer specialist, I was taught to think of a computer pro-
- · --~~~n~;nn~ to a computer. But in one of my 
,Cu 
,er 
Supreme C01lrt of the United St11/P8 
Memorand11,m 
__ __ ______ December __ 11 ----, 19 __ 7 5 _ 
Sally, 
I have had some second thoughts 
about what I was saying to the 
Justice this morning about 
computer program patents. I 
don't know i f he is interested 
in them, but if you think he is 
I have put them into a memo 
which you can give to him. 
Kent 
c of techniques for converting 
ical circuits which perform the 
expensive, but it is guaranteed 
sical machine. My thought 
urposes a computer program 
ications for a machine which, 
performs a function as set 
iduction to practice is not 
1achine", so it does not 
:o practice by running it on 
; it to a computer engineer 
purpose computer. 
~bility of computer programs, 
the specifications) and not 
duction to practice) which 
herwise a patent would be 
physical form of a machine. 
specifications for a machine. 
~ can turn any valid computer 
which performs the function(s) 
Lded he understands the lan-
Nritten. 
~ would result from such a 
lled computer engineer is 
am is patentable. 
unoriginal and/or obvious, 
of reasoning it seems clear 
~ patentable subject matter. 
- . mber 11, 1975 
To: Mr. J ustice Powell 
From, Kent Bloom, Assistant Clerk (Computer specialist) 
Subjects Patentability of computer programs 
Our conversation this morning while riding to work started me 
thinking again about the patentability of computer programs, and 
I was struck with the idea that I have been approaching this problem 
from the wrong direction. 
As a computer specialist, I was taught to think of a computer pro-
gram as a series of instructions to a computer. But in one of my 
graduate courses, I was exposed to a set of techniques for converting 
any computer program into a set of physical circuits which perform the 
same function. This operation is very expensive, but it is guaranteed 
to t urn any computer program into a physical machine. My thought 
was that, in view of this, for patent purposes a computer program 
s hould be considered as a set of specifications for a machine which, 
when reduced to practice, mechanically performs a function as set 
fo r th in the program. The method of reduction to practice is not 
re l evant to the patentability of the "machine'', so it does not 
matter whether the program is reduced to practice by running it on 
a general purpose computer or by giving it to a computer engineer 
who uses is as the plans for a special purpose computer. 
Thus my argument supporting the patentability of computer programs, 
a s machines, is as f o llows, , 
1) It is the design of a machine (the specifications) and not 
its physical embodiment (the reduction to practice) which 
~ is the subject of a patent. Otherwise a patent would be 
avoided merely by changing the physical form of a machine. 
2) A computer program is a set of specifications for a machine. 
Any computent computer engineer can turn any valid computer 
program into a physical device which performs the function(s) 
described in the program, provided he understands the lan-
guage in which the program is written. 
3) Therefore, if the machine which would result from such a 
reduction to practice by a skilled computer engineer is 
patentable, the computer program is patentable. 
Of course, most computer programs are unoriginal and/or obvious, 
and not patentable, but by this line of reasoning it seems clear 
t o me computer programs as a class are patentable subject matter. 
- . mber 11, 1975 
To : Mr . Justice Powell 
From: Ke nt Bloom, Assistant Clerk (Computer specialist) 
Subject s Pat entability of computer programs 
Our c onversat ion t his morning while riding to work started me 
thinking again about the patentability of computer programs, and 
I was struck with the idea that I have been approaching this problem 
from the wrong di rection. 
As a computer specialist, I was taught to think of a computer pro-
gram as a s erie s of instructions to a computer. But in one of my 
graduate courses , I was exposed to a set of techniques for converting 
any compute r prog ram into a set of physical circuits which perform the 
same function . This operation is very expensive, but it is guaranteed 
to turn a ny c omputer program into a physical machine. My thought 
wa s t hat , in vie w of this, for patent purposes a computer program 
should be c o nsidered as a set of specifications for a machine which, 
when reduced to practice, mechanically performs a function as set 
forth i n the p r o g ram. The method of reduction to practice is not 
relevant t o t he patentability of the "machine", so it does not 
matter whether the program is reduced to practice by running it on 
a general purpose computer or by giving it to a computer engineer 
who uses is as the plans for a special purpose computer. 
Thus my argument supporting the patentability of computer programs, 
as machines, is a s follows: , 
1) It is the design of a machine (the specifications) and not 
its physical embodiment (the reduction to practice) which 
_ . .,;· is the subject of a patent. Otherwise a patent would be 
avoided merely by changing the physical form of a machine. 
2) A computer program is a set of specifications for a machine. 
Any computent computer engineer can turn any valid computer 
program into a physical device which performs the function(s) 
described in the program, provided he understands the lan-
guage in which the program is written. 
3) Therefore, if the machine which would result from such a 
reduction to practice by a skilled computer engineer is 
patentable, the computer program is patentable. 
Of course, most computer programs are unoriginal and/or obvious, 
and not patentable, but by this line of reasoning it seems clear 
to me computer programs as a class are patentable subject matter. 
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1st DRAFT 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 74-1033 
c. Marshall Dann, Commis-1 On Writ of Certiorari to 
sioner of Patents and the United States Court 
Trademarks, Petitioner, 
v. 
Thomas R. Johnston. 
of Customs and Patent 
Appeals. 
[March - , 1076] 
MR. JusTICE MARSHALL delivered the opinion of the 
Court. 
Respondent has applied for a patent on what is 
described in his patent application as a "machine system 
for automatic record keeping of bank checks and de-
posits." The system permits a bank to furnish a cus-
tomer with subtotals of various categories of transactions 
completed in connection with the customer's single 
account, thus saving the customer the time and/ or ex-
pense of conducting this bookkeeping himself. As re-
spondent has noted , the "invention is being sold as a 
computer program to banks and to other data processing 
companies so that they can perform these data processing 
services for depositors." Brief for Appellant, at 18, 
Application of Johnston, 502 F. 2d 765 (CCPA 1974) . 
Petitioner and respondent, as well as various amici, 
have presented lengthy arguments addressed to the ques-
tion of the general patentability of computer programs. 
Cf. Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U. S. 63 (1972). We find 
no need to treat that question in this case, however, 
because we conclude that in any event respondent's sys-







DANN v. JOHNSTON 
-
U. S. C. § 103. Since the United States Court of Cus-
toms and Patent Appeals (CCPA) found respondent's 
system to be patentable, Application of Johnston, supra, 
the decision of that court is accordingly reversed. 
I 
While respondent's patent application @£ 111111:AA per-
tains to the highly esoteric field of computer technology, 
the basic functioning of his invention is not difficult to 
comprehend. Under respondent's system a bank cus-
tomer labels each check that he writes with a numerical 
category code corresponding to the purpose for which 
the funds are being expended. For instance, "food ex-
penditures" might be a category coded "123," "fuel ex-
penditures" a category coded "124" and "rent" still 
another categor~ coded "125." Similarly, on each 
deposit slip, the customer, again through a category code, 
indicates the source of the funds that he is depositing. 
When the checks and deposit slips are processed by the 
bank, the category codes are entered upon them in mag-
netic ink characters, just as, under existing procedures, 
the amount of the check or deposit is entered in such 
characters. Entries in magnetic ink allow the informa-
tion associated with them to be "read" by special docu-
ment reading devices and then processed by data proces-
sors. On being read by such a device, the coded records 
of the customer's transactions are, under respondent's 
· 'system, electronically stored in what respondent terms a 
"transaction file ." Respondent's application describes 
the steps from this point as follows : 
"To process the transaction file , the [system] em-
ploys a data processor, such as a programmable 
electronic digital computer, having certain data 
storage files and a control system. In addition to 
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used to store all of the records required for each 
customer in accordance with the customer's own 
chart of accounts. The latter is individually 
designed to the customer's needs and also consti-
tuted to cooperate with the control system in the 
processiqg of the customer's transactions. The con-
trol system directs the generation of periodic output 
reports for the customer which present the custom-
er's transaction records in accordance with his own 
chart of accounts and desired accounting proce-
dures." Respondent's Patent Application, at 7-8, 
Appendix, at 5. 
Thus, when the time comes for the bank customf's 
regular periodic statement to be rendered, the prograrrYfd 
computer sorts out the entries in the various categories 
and is able to produce a statement which groups the 
entries according to category and which gives subtotals 
for each category. The customer can then quickly see 
how much he spent or received in any given category 
during the period in question. Moreover, according to 
respondent, the system can " [adapt] to whatever varia-
tion in ledger format a user may specify." Brief for 
Respondent, at 66. 
In further description of the control system that is 
used in the invention, respondent's application recites 
that it is made up of a general control and a master 
control. The general control directs the processing op~ 
erations common to most customers and is in the form 
of a software computer program, i. e., a program that 
is meant to be used in a general purpose digital com-
puter. The master control, directing the operations that 
vary on an individual basis with each customer, is in 
the form of a separate sequence of records for each 
customer containing suitable machine instruction mecha-
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spondent's application sets out a flow chart of a program 
compatible with an IBM 1400 computer which would 
effectuate his system. 
Under respondent's invention, then , a general purpose 
computer is prograntd to provide bank customers with 
an individualized and categorized breakdown of their 
transactions during the period in question. 
II 
After reviewing respondent's patent application, the 
patent examiner rejected all the claims therein. He 
found that respondent's claims were invalid as being 
antic~ted by the prior art. 35 U. S. C. § 102, and as 
not 'particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming" 
what respondent was urging to be his invention. -35 
U.S. C. § 112. 
Respondent appealed to the Patent and Trademark 
Board of Appeals. · The Board rejected respondent's ap-
plication on several grounds. It found first that under 
35 U. S. C. § 112, the application was indefinite and did 
not distinctly enough claim what respondent was claim-
ing to be his invention. It also concluded that respond-
ent's claims were invalid under 35 U. S. C. § 101 be-
cause they claimed nonstatutory subject matter. Ac-
cording to the Board, compute"(t-related inventions which 
extend "beyond the field of technology . . .. are non,-
statutory," Appenqix to Petition for Certiorari, at 3la, 
see In re Foster, 438 F. 2d 1011, 1015 (CCPA 1971), In 
re Musgrave; 431 F. 2d 882 (CCPA 1970) , and respond-
ent's claims were viewed to be "ndn-technological." Fi ... 
nally, respondent's claims were rejected on grounds of 
obviousness. 35 U. S. C. § 103. ·"The Board found that 
respondent's claims were obvious variations of estab-
lished uses of digital computers in banking and obvious 
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organizations, that had already been patented. Dirks, 
U. S. Patent No. 3,343,133. 
The CCP A, in a 3---2 ruling, reversed the decision of the 
Board and helq. respondent's invention to be patentable. 
The Court began by distinguishing its view of respond-
ent's invention as a "record-keeping machine system for 
financial accounts" from the Board's rather negative view 
of the claims as going solely to the "relationship of a 
bank and its customers." 502 F. 2d, at 770 ( emphasis 
in CCPA opinion) . As such, the CCPA held, respond-
ent's system was "clearly within the 'technological arts,' " 
id., at 771, and was therefore statutory subject matter 
under 35 U. S. C. § 101. Moreover, the Court held 
that respondent's claims were narrowly enough drawn 
and sufficiently detailed to pass muster under the definite-
ness requirements of 35 U. S. C. § 112. Dealing with 
the final area of the Board's rejection, the CCP A found 
that neither established banking practice nor the Dirks 
patent rendered respondent's system "obvious to one of 
ordinary skill in the art who did not have [respondent's] 
specification before him." 502 F. 2d, at 772. 
In order to hold respondent's invention to be patent-
able, the CCP A also found it necessary to distinguish this 
Court's decision in Gottschalk v. Benson, supra, handed 
down some 13 months subsequent to the Board's ruling in 
the instant case. In Benson, the respondent sought to 
patent as a "new and useful process," 35 U. S. C. § 101., 
"a method of programming a general purpose digital com-
puter to convert signals from binary-coded decimal form 
into pure binary form." /}f., at 65. As we observed, 
" [ t] he claims were not limited to any particular art or 
technology, to any particular apparatus or machinery, or 
to any particular end use." Id., at p4. Carefully noting 




DANN v. JOHNSTON 
-
respondent's method was not a patentable "process" as 
that term is defined in 35 U. S. C. § 100 (b) .1 
The Solicitor of the Patent Office argued before the 
CCPA that. Benson's holding of nonpatentability as to 
the computer program in that case was controlling here. 
However, the CCP A, obviously sensitive to the limita-
tions we placed oµ our holding in Benson, concluded that 
while Benson involved a claim as to the patentability of 
a "process," respondent in this case was advancing claims 
as to the patentability of an "apparatus" or "machine" 
which did not involve discoveries so abstract as to 'be 
unpatentable : 
" 'The issue considered by the Supreme Court in 
Benson was a narrow one, namely, is a formula for 
' converting binary coded decimal numerals into pure 
binary numerals by a series of mathematical calcu-
lations a patentable process ? [In Re Christensen, 
478 F. 2d 1392 (CCPA 1973)] (emphasis added) ;' 
"[T]he instant claims in apparatus form do not 
claim or encompass a law of nature, a mathematical 
formula, or an algorithm." 502 F . 2d, at 771 (em-
phasis in original) . 
Having disposed of the Board's rejections and having 
distinguished Benson, the Court held respondent's inven-
tion to be patentable. The Commissioner of Patents 
sought review in this Court and we granted certiorari. 
421 U. S. 962 (1975). We hold that respondent's inven-
tion was obvious under 35 U. S. -c. § 103 and therefore 
.reverse. 
III 
As a judicial test, "invention"~i. e. "an exercise of the 
1 "The term 'process' means process, art or method, and includes 
. a new use of a known process, machine, manufacture, composition 
rof matter, or material." 35 U. S. C. § 100 (b). 
-
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inventive faculty," McClain v. Ortmayer, 141 U. S. 419, 
427 (1891)-has long been regarded as an absolute pre.-
requisite to patentability. See, e.g., Keystone Drills Co .. 
v. Northwest Engineering Corp., 294 U. S. 42 (1935); 
Sharp v. Stamping Co.., 103 U. S. 250 ( 1880); Hotchkiss 
v. Greenwood, 11 H<.'Jw. 248 (1851). However, it w11s 
only in 1952 that Congress, in the interest of "uniformity 
and definiteness," articulated the -requirement in a stat-
ute, framing it as a requirement of "nonobviousness." 2 
Section 103 of the Patent Act of 1952, 35 U. S. C. § 103, 
provides in full : 
"A patent may not be obtained though the invention 
is not identically disclosed or described or set forth 
in section 102 of this title, if the differences between 
the subject matter sought to be patented and the 
prior art are such that the subject matter as ·It 
whole would have been obvious at the time the 
invention was made to a person having ordinary 
skill in the art to which said subject matter pertain~. 
Pateniability shall not be negatived by the manner 
in which the invention was made." 
This Court treated the scope of § 103 in detail in 
Graham v. John Deere Co. , 383 U. S. 1 (1966). Ther~,. 
we held that § 103 "was not intended by Congress to 
change the general level of patentable invention," but 
was meant "merely as a codification of judicial prece-
dents ... with congressional directions that inquiries into 
the obviousness of the subject matter sought to be pat-
ented are a prerequisite to patentability:" Id., at 17. 
While recognizing the inevitability of difficulty in making· 
the determination in some cases, we also set out in 
Graham, supra, the central factors relevant to any in-
2 S. Rep. No. rn79 , 82d Cong., 2d Sess., 6 (1952); H. R. Rep. No;. 
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quiry into obviousness : "the scope and content of the 
prior art," the "differences between the prior art and the 
claims at issue," and "the level of ordinary skill in the 
pertinent art." Ibid. Guided by these factors, we pro-
ceed to 1:1,n inquiry into the obviousness of respondent's 
system. 
4~ { As noted, supra, at~ the Patent and Trademark Office 
Board of Appeals relied on two elements in the prior art 
in reaching their conclusion that respondent's system 
was obvious, We find both to be highly significant. 
The first was the nature of the current use of data proc-
essing equipment and computer programs in the banking 
industry. As respondent's application itself observes, 
that use is extensive : 
"Automatic data processing equipments employing 
digital computers have been developed for the han-
dling of much of the record-keeping operations in-
volved in a banking system. The checks and deposit 
slips are automatically processed by forming those 
items as machine readable records . . . . With such 
machine systems, most of the extensive data han-
dling required in a bank can be performed auto-
matically." Respondent's Patent Application, at 2, 
Appendix, at 3. 
It is through the use of such data processing equipment 
that periodic statements are ordinarily given to a bank 
customer on each of the several accounts that he may 
have at a given bank. Under respondent's system, what 
might previously have been separate accounts are treated 
as a single account, and the customer can see on a single 
statement the status and progress of each of his "sub-
accounts." Respondent's "category code" scheme, see 
p. 2, supra, is, we think, closely analogous to a bank's 
offering its customers multiple accounts from which to 
choose for making a deposit or writing a check. Indeedr 
~s not.~d by the Board, the additiQn Qf a category number,. 
-
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varying· with the nature of the transaction, to the end of 
a bank customer's regular account number, creates "in 
effect, a series of different and distinct account num~ 
bers .... " Petition for Certiorari, at 34a. Moreover, we 
note that banks have long segregated debits attributable 
to service charges within any given separate account and 
have rendered their customers subtotals for those charges. 
The utilization of automatic data processing equipment 
in the traditional separate account system, is, of course, 
somewhat different from the system encompassed by 
respondent's invention. As the CCP A noted, respond-
ent's invention does something other than "provide a 
customer with . .. a summary sheet consisting of net 
totals of plural separate accounts which a customer may 
have at a bank." 502 F. 2d, at 77. However, it must· 
be remembered that the "obviousness" test of § 103 iS' 
not one which turns on whether an invention is equiva-
lent to some element in the prior art but rather whether 
the difference between the prior art and the subject mat-
ter in question "is a difference sufficient to render the 
claimed subject matter unobvious to one skilled in the 
applicable art. . . .
11 
Id., at 772 (Markey, C. J., 
dissenting) . 
There is no need to make the obviousness determina.-· 
tion in this case turn solely on the basis of loo~ing at the 
nature of the current use of data processing and com-
puter programing in the banking industry. For, as 
noted, the Board pointed to a second factor-a patent is~ 
sued to Gerhard Dirks-which also supports a conclusion 
of obviousness. · The Dirks patent discloses a complex 
automatic data processing system using a progra~d· 
digital computer for use in a large business organization. 
Under the system transaction and balance files can be 
kept and updated for each department of the orgartiza-• 
tion. The Dirks system allows a breakdown within each 
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expenses. Moreover, the system is sufficiently flexibl~ 
to provide additional breakdowns of "sub-arep,s" within 
the areas and can record and store specially designated 
information regarding each of any department's transac-
tions. ·Thus, for instance, under the Dirks system the 
disbursing office of a corporation can continually be kept 
apprised of the precise level and nature of the corpora-
tion's disbursements within various ar~as or, as the Dirks 
patent terms them, "Item Groups." 
Again, as was the case with the prior art within the 
banking industry the Dirks invention is not equivalent 
to respondent's system. However, the departments of 
the business organization and the areas or "Item Groups" 
under the Dirks system are closely analogous to the bank 
customers and category number designations respectively 
under respondent's system. And ea,,ch shares a similar 
capacity to provide breakdowns within its "Item Groups" 
or category numbers. While the Dirks invention is not 
designed specifically for application to the banking in-
dustry many of its characteristics and capabilities are 
similar to those of respondent's system. Cf. Graham, 
supra, 383 U. S., at 35. 
In making the determination of "obviousness," it is im-
portant to remember that the criterion is meas\lred not in 
terms of what would be obvious to a layman but rather 
what would be obvious to "one skilled in the applicable , 
art." 35 U. S. C. § 103. In the context of the subject 
matter of the instant case, it can be assumed that such a 
hypothetical person would have been aware both of the-
nature of the extensive use of data processing systems in 
the banking industry and of the system encompassed in 
the Dirks patent. Computer technology is an exploding 
one but "[i] t is but an evenhanded application to require-
that those persons granted the benefit of a patent monop~ ff 
oly be charged with the awareness" of that technology .. 
Graham, supra, 383 U. S., at.19 •. 
. . -
74-1033-0PINION 
DANN v. JOHNSTON 
-
11 
Assuming such an awareness, respondent's system 
would, we think, have been obvious to one "skilled in the 
applicable art." iff eren . there may oe between re-
spondent's invention and the state of the prior art. Re-
spondent makes much of his system's ability to allow "a 
large number of small users to get the benefit of large-
scale electronic computer equipment and still continue 
to use their individual ledger format for bookkeeping 
methods." Brief for Respondent, at 65. It may be 
that that ability is not possessed to the same extent either 
by existing machine systems in the banking industry or 
by the Dirks system.3 But the mere existence of differ-
ences between the prior art and an invention does not 
establish the invention's nonobviousness. ·The gap be-
t.ween the prior art 11,nd respondent's system is simply 
not so great as to render the system unobvious to one 
skilled in the art.4 
Accordingly, we reverse the Court of Customs and 
Patent Appeatrs and remand this case to that court for 
further proceedings dlllllla.consistent with this opiniop. 
So ordere<j,. 
MR. JtrsTICE STEVENS took no part in the consideration 
or decision of this case. 
3 The Dirk5 patent does allow "the departments or other organi-
zational users [i. e. the analogues to bank customers under respond-
ent 's invention , to] retain their authority over operative file 
systems" and indicates that " [p]rogramming is very easy and dif-
ferent programs are very easily coordinated." 
4 We indicated in Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1 (1966) , 
tha.t "secondary considerat ions [ such] as commercial success, long-
felt but u~solved needs, [~nd] failure of ot hers" may have relevancy 
i'n a determination of obviommess . 383 U. S. , at 13. Respondent 
does not contend nor can we ,;onclude t hat any of these secondary 
considerations offer any substantial support for his claims of 
n~obviousnes,s ... 
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CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE POTTER STEWART 
/ 
February 26, 1976 
Re: No. 74-1033, Dann v. Johnston 
Dear Thurgood, 
I am glad to join your opinion for the 
Court in this case. 
Mr. Justice Marshall 
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I agree. 
Mr. Justice Marshall 
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JUSTICE WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST 
March 2, 1976 
Re: No. 74-1033 - Dann, Commissioner, v. Johnston 
Dear Thurgood: 
Please join me. 
Sincerely, ~ 
Mr. Justice Marshall 
Copies to the Conferenc e 
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C HA"'IBERS OF 
.JUSTICE BYRON R . W HITE 
March 19, 1976 
Re: No. 74-1033 - Dann v. Johnston 
Dear Thurgood: 
As you know, I am with you in this case. 
I am sorry I did not confirm this at an earlier 
time. 
Mr. Justice Marshall 
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I join you in your circulation of March 4. You have 
now paid your debt to patents! 
RegardG':J 
Mr. Justice Marshall 
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